INTRODUCTION
In the nineteenth century Western nations turned to imprisonent as the standard form of criminal punishment, replacing mutilation, corporal punishment, and banishment. Spurred by this reformist impulse, public opinion demanded that prisons meet some minimal levels of human necessity, if not human decency. At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries the scientific revolution reached the art of healing. As physicians became able to systematically heal the ills of the body, access to medical care joined the list of necessaries to be provided to prisoners. Moreover, improved medical care has arrived at a time marked by a fundamental shift in attitudes towards prisoners' rights. No longer are prisoners said to be slaves of the state and entitled only to the rights granted them by the basic humanity and whims of their jailors.
1 Instead, it is recognized today that the prisoner is confined for the protection of the public, and therefore "[lit is but just that the public be required to care
for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself." [Dluring his term of service in the penitentiary, he is in a state of penal servitude to the State. He has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the State.
2 Spicer v. Wlliamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926) . Because the duty of care was one owed by the public, the court found that a sheriff or other officer could not be held personally liable for failure to provide medical attention. See also People ex rd. This trend toward increased recognition of prisoners' rights, including the right to medical care, is reflected not only in the statutes 3 and tort law' of most states, but also in the recent erosion of the "hands-off" doctrine. In its tersest legal formulation, "the hands-off doctrine represents a denial of jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitions from prisoners alleging some form of mistreatment or contesting some deprivation undergone during imprisonment." 5 This lack of subject matter jurisdiction has no statutory basis but is instead a judge-made limitation. Underlying the doctrine is an assessment that the deprivations prisoners complain of are necessary conditions of imprisonment. A more important basis for the hands-off doctrine is a profound reluctance by the courts to interfere with prison administration. Part of this reluctance is the fear that judicial interference would create a flood of litigation and would destroy prison discipline. 6 The validity of the grounds for the hands-off doctrine has been reconsidered and courts have retreated from their former tendency to apply the 4octrine strictly. Although the reluctance of the unlawful conduct does not end when the doors of a prison dose behind him. True it is that a person sentenced to a period of confinement in a penal institution is necessarily deprived of many personal liberties. Yet there are certain rights [including the right to communicate to officers of the court or governmental officials] so necessary and essential to prevent the abuse of power and illegal conduct that not even a prison sentence can annul them.") CA. PENaL CODE § 2650 (West 1970) : "The person of a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment in the State prison is under the protection of the law, and any injury to his person, not authorized by law, is punishable courts to interfere with internal prison matters is no longer as strong as it once was, there are still barriers to suits brought by prisoners. At the present time, "hands-off" is still the rule when routine prison administrative decisions are challenged. Yet the greater availability of certain remedies, primarily under federal habeas corpus and civil rights statutes, means definite exceptions have been carved from the hands-off rule A major problem in understanding developments in this area of law is that the substantive content of rights has remained essentially unchanged but existing remedies have been applied to an increased number of fact situations presented by prisoners' complaints. Expansion of remedies has not been the result of the abrogation of explicit jurisdictional barriers, but rather is due to an unfolding awareness that more of the facts of imprisonment complained of constitute justifiable claims under available remedies. No longer is senseless or irrational mistreatment regarded as a natural condition of imprisonment. The recognition that fewer privations are necessarily the prisoner's lot has been accompanied by a gradual discrediting of the rationales supporting the hands off doctrine. For example, the argument that courts will be flooded by prisoners' suits has been rejected when the claim is made that a protected constitutional right has been seriously infringed 8 Also, it is now argued that statutes which create departments of corrections within the executive branch of government should not be regarded as precluding judicial review of administrative decisions by corrections officials. 9 In administrative law terms, the recent erosion of the hands-off doctrine represents a belated move away from the nineteenth century position of unreviewability to a sounder position of "presumption of reviewability." 10 Just how far the courts have gone will be seen in the examination of cases later in this paper. This article will examine the law of prisoners'
REMINGTON at 826-51; TEE P SREsmENT's Come- rights to medical care and will focus on the substantive and procedural rights of convicts in federal and state prisons. Cases dealing with prisoners in special facilities will not be considered. For the purposes of this article, "medical care" refers to the heating and alleviating of physical ailments, and to dental care. The right to psychiatric care and the right to rehabilitative treatment are not specifically considered. The conclusion will offer some suggestions for changes in law and in administrative practice which would result in better medical care for prisoners with a minimum of judicial interference in prison administration.
I. STATE LAW RELATING TO MEDICAL CARE OF PRISONERS

A. Substantive Rights
Not all state statutes which regulate prison affairs and the treatment of prisoners provide standards for medical care. The Michigan statute," " The relevant Michigan statutes, MIcH. ComP. LAws (1948) , recite: § 800.15 It shall be the duty of the physician of the prison: First, To attend at all times to the wants of sick convicts whether in the hospital, or i6 their cells, and to bestow upon them all necessary medical service;
Second, In company ith the hall master, to examine weekly the cells of the convicts, for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are kept in a proper state of cleanliness and ventilation, and if they are not so kept to point out to said hall master the deficiencies, and report the same monthly to the board of such prison; Third, To prescribe the diet of sick convicts, and his directions in relation thereto shall be strictly followed; and to be present at and superintend all corporal punishments which may be inflicted in the prison; Fourth, To keep a daily record of all admissions to the hospital, and of cases treated in the cells or elsewhere, indicating the sex, color, nativity, age, occupation, habits of life, crime, period of entrance and discharge from the hospital, and disease; Fifth, To make a yearly report to the board of the prison of the sanitary condition of the prison. during the year, which report shall also contain a condensed statement of the information contained in his daily record;
Sixth, To make all such other reports as the board or warden may from time to time require. § 800.16 It shall be the duty of such physician, in case of any convict claiming to be unable to labor by means of sickness, to examine such convict; and if it is his opinion upon such examination that such convict is unable to labor, he shall immediately certify the same to the warden, and such convict shall thereupon be relieved from labor and admitted to the hospital, or placed in his cell or elsewhere, for medical treatment, as said physician shall direct, having a due regard for the safekeeping of such convict-and such convict shall nnt ANN. art. 6166-6203g (1970) ) occupy 70 pages in the code book while those dealing with Patriotism and the Flag occupy 64 pages. Of those 70 pages (including annotations) dealing with the operation of State prisons, eight are concemed with the lease of prison lands for oil and gas. The only sections which are even remotely concerned with the health of prisoners deal with food (art. 6166t), labor (art. 6166x), an emergency section to renovate a prison (art. 6203), the establishment of a psychopathic hospital (art. 6203e) and reports of death (art. 6166z). 
B. Procedural Remedies
There are two broad categories of state court remedies for complaints of medical mistreatment. One remedy is the traditional suit-in tort for personal injury. The other type of remedy is an action seeking relief of an injunctive nature against continuing wrongs. The injunctive suit has the potential for more far-reaching impact on the prison system, even though injunctive relief is granted, if at all, only when a serious violation of rights is shown.
Tort Remedies. Despite the fairly generous position of the courts in recognizing prisoners' substantive rights to necessaries such as medical care, procedures for enforcement of these rights are inadequate. 8 161, 162-63 (1965) , indicating that the purpose of the doctrine is to protect the innocent wife or children of a prisoner. The civil death doctrine has been thought generally inapplicable for the additional reason that at common law, only prisoners convicted of a felony punishable by death were deemed civilly dead. Shapiro, supra note 21. approach, the civil death restriction on lawsuits has been weakened by both legislatures and the courts. However, prisoners must sometimes bear procedural burdens greater than those borne by free litigants. In tort actions brought against the state, any claim must be filed within ninety days "unless the claimant shall file a written notice of intention to file a claim ... , in which event the claim shall be filed within two years after the accrual of such claim." N.Y. CoURT oF CLAiMs ACT § 10(3) (McKinney 1963) . But since an injured prisoner's right to file a claim while in prison is suspended, his only procedure is to file a notice of intention within ninety days, and to present the claim itself within two years after the disability is removed. The result is that a prisoner suing the state must file two notices of his tort claim while free citizens need file only one. See Federman v. State, 173 Misc. 830, 19 N.Y.S. 2d 325 (Ct. Cl. 1940); Baroness v. State, 153 Misc. 212, 274 N.Y.S; 2d 522 (Ct. Cl. 1934) . The prisoner may also be relegated to a long wait before he is released and can present his claim to a court.
In some situations however, prisoners' disabilities may not necessarily bind substituted parties. Garner v. Schulte Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 127, 259 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1965) is an example. The wife of a state prisoner filed a claim in his name for recovery of workmen's compensation, contending that since her husband was serving a life sentence, he was civilly dead. The court reversed the denial of the claim by the Workman's Compensation Board, holding that the prisoner's wife could recover as if her husband were actually dead, so long as the claim were prosecuted in the wife's name. While the decision is based on the civil death doctrine, the court managed to limit the doctrine to its historical purpose while permitting a substituted party to recover even though the prisoner could not. One commentator has suggested that because Garner allows an action to be brought by a substituted party, it undercuts the theory and practice of the civil death statute. Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BUp:FALo L. REV. 397, 404 (1965 341, 344-49, 44 A.2d 807, 808-12 (1945); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465-68 (1938) (indicating habeas corpus may not be used as a writ of error, but only as a challenge to a judgment which is void, because, for example, imposed by a court without jurisdiction).
If the habeas corpus remedy were not limited to total discharge but were equitable in nature, courts might be encouraged to consider habeas petitions raising other issues besides the question of jurisdiction of the convicting court. See Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 230-31, 392 P.2d 279, 280 (1964) . contain "inexcusable and shocking" facts which go beyond matters of prison discipline."
A third approach to habeas corpus would apparently allow relief where only an administrative decision is challenged, even if no constitutional question is raised. This liberal approach was suggested by the New York Court of Appeals in People ex rel. Brown v. Johnson." There a prisoner applied for habeas corpus to challenge his transfer from a prison to a hospital for the criminally insane. The court held that the writ was improperly denied because the appellate court failed to inquire whether petitioner's removal could been "uncontrolled and arbitrary."4 The teaching of the lohnson opinion is that habeas corpus cannot be used to challenge the final judgment of a competent court but it is available to challenge "any further restraint in excess of that permited by the judgment or constitutional guarantees." "5 Petitioner's transfer to a hospital for the criminally insane would be a restraint in excess of that imposed by his conviction, and he was thus entitled to a hearing on his sanity. The court concluded its opinion with the dictum that when an excessive restraint is alleged, the writ of habeas corpus need not present constitutional questions. 3 It has been suggested that cruel and unusual punishment results from an intentional denial of needed medical treatment, or from "reckless disregard, callous inattention, or gross negligence." 4 Even if arbitrary and capricious conduct on the part of prison officials is charged, it appears petitioner must also allege that medical care was administered as punishment. 45 Under these rules the following have been held not to constitute cruel and unusual punishment: allowing nonmedical personnel to treat a prisoner, either with or without the prisoner's consent; 46 administering a drug by force, as a "last resort"; 47 confinement and segregation for more than two years when imposed not for disciplinary control but as an administrative control for the protection of inmates;
4' and striking a prisoner when the beating is part of a justified attempt to search the prisoner.
classification of prisoners and in (2) In addition to the Tort Claims Act, the Federal Prison Industries Corporation is empowered to pay out of the Prison Industries Fund "compensation to inmates or their dependents for injuries suffered in any industry or in any work activity in connection with the maintenance or operation of the institution where confined." 7 Such compensation is not to exceed the amounts provied in the Federal Employees Compensation Act," and It was apparently satisfied petitioner had been "mistreated" and had suffered "unnecessary hardship." Although the court found that it could not release petitioner from confinement, it recognized that "in circunstances involving continuing cruel and unusual punishment, ... the Court is empowered to fashion appropriate equitable relief ..." 318 F. Supp. at 1348.
10 28 U.S.C. § § 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1964 recovery under this act precludes recovery under the Tort Claims Act.
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Remedies for Continuing Wrongs. As discussed earlier, the principles regarding the substantive rights of federal prisoners to medical care do not differ substantially from those applied to state prisoners by federal courts. Similarly, the philosophy of the federal courts, that all prisoners must have reasonable access to courts to complain about continuing and serious medical wrongs, does not differ from the state court view. In an addendum to the opinion in Ramsey v. Ciccone" 0 Chief Judge Becker suggested that the available remedies for continuing wrongs to federal prisoners in medical care cases are habeas corpus, suit for injunction, suit for declaratory judgment, and suit for damages. He concluded that habeas corpus is the preferred remedy, 6 ' largely because the writ is well adapted to quick resolution of inmates' claims.
III. FEDER.AL LAW in STATE PRISONS
A. The Hands-Off Doctrine Amplified by Federalism
The extension of the Federal Tort Claims Act to federal prisoners was characterized as "merely a tidying up oleration"' 2 after the larger legislative reform of overturning federal sovereign immunity. In the area of prisoners' rights the greater struggle was yet to come. The overwhelming number of maximum security prisoners were in state institutions and federal courts almost unanimously denied them redress.6 The reluctance on the part of the federal courts to interfere was based not only on the hands-off doctrine" but also on considerations of federalism. While there is some question as to the present status of the hands-off doctrine, there is broad agreement in the federal courts that the doctrine is not a bar where deprivations alleged are of constitutional dimension. 7 ' 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944) . Petitioner had been returned to prison after he violated probation. He applied for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that at the time he pled guilty he was incapable of discussing his case with his attorney, and that his confession was improperly obtained. The district judge refused to grant leave to file for the writ, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding petitioner's allegations were sufficient to require respondent to show cause why a writ should not issue. Petitioner had also filed another petition for habeas corpus with the Sixth Circuit, alleging that he suffered injuries while in confinement. The court referred this second petition along with the original petition to the district court and, in an effort to guide the district judge, the court observed that petitioner would be entitled to a writ if his confinement was made "more burdensome" than the law allows. Despite some hesitancy, the courts did allow actions under the act, at least where the deliberate failure to provide medical care was under the color of state law and was regarded as a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution.P After Monroe, however, federal courts were flooded with civil rights actions of all kinds.P Monroe is of singular importance because the Court, after an extensive review of legislative history, concluded that the remedy provided by the Civil Rights Act is "supplementary" to the state remedy, thus the state remedy need not be exhausted before federal relief is sought. The act "provided a remedy where state law was inadequate" and "provide[d] a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice."
4 Federal courts have regulated the number of civil rights actions, however, by narrowly defining federal rights. Federal courts thus occupy a middle ground with respect to involvement in state prisons partly because of the judiciary's well-recognized reluctance to oversee the operations of prisons. 8 5 To be successful, a civil rights action must show that federal rights have been violated. The rights which have been invoked with the greatest effectiveness are the eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and the fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection clauses 8 Not every deprivation, however, reaches the magnitude of a constitutional violation. For example, the rule in the Second Circuit is that, to be actionable, a failure to provide medical care must "shock the conscience" or in some way exceed mere negligence.P One might question a rule which relies on a "shocks the conscience" test, inasmuch as that test has been discredited in search and seizure4 and other areas of state administration of criminal justicePn While the test is outmoded for some purposes, it is consonant with the hands-off doctrine and gives needed latitude to prison administrators. The test is also consistent with the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act, which was aimed primarily at egregious violations of rights. 90 Without question, most federal courts balance prisoners' rights against a policy in favor of prison administration, with the result that only "outrageous" 9 1 violations of rights are likely to be remedied."
The fact that many civil rights complaints are submitted pro se by prisoners causes practical and procedural problems for federal courts. For example, the complaints may be so vague and conclusory they they fail to allege constitutional deprivations with the necessary specificity.
3 On the other hand, "0 See generally, Shapo, Constitutional Tort at 280-
81.
"Id. at 305, discussing prisoners' rights cases in general: "If a test emerges from this group of cases, it may be described as an 'outrageousness' requirement."
Similarly other federal circuits deny recovery unless the deprivation of rights is in some way extraordinary. In the Third Circuit an allegation of improper medical care alone "is legally insufficient to establish a denial of rights secured under the federal constitution or laws" and states a cause of action only when the treatment or lack of it is cruel and unusual. In the Seventh Circuit, a prisoner does not have a cognizable complaint under the Civil Rights Act unless he can show exceptional circumstances, such as the total denial of medical care. Coleman v. Johnson, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957) . In Ninth Circuit cases, inadequate medical care or termination of medical care which does not seriously injure a prisoner does not state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act. Snow v. Gladden, 388 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1964) . However a refusal to care for histoplasmosis, a form of tuberculosis, was sufficient to entitle plaintiff to a hearing on his complaint. Riley v. Rhay, 407 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1969) . Finally, in the Tenth Circuit, a "claim of total denial of medical care differs from a claim of inadequacy of medical care" and a "difference of opinion between the lay wishes of the patient and the professional diagnosis of the doctor" does not state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act. Coppinger v. Townshend, 398 F.2d 392, 394 (10th Cir. 1968).
"See Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir.
the complaint may be so long and complicated, and involve so many defendants, as to place a severe burden on the time and resources of the courts.' 4 The basic problem is one concerning legal aid to prisoners but is tangentially related to all other rights.
0
Another procedural remedy concerns the necessity of an evidentiary hearing in section 1983 cases. In the absence of an answer to the complaint or an evidentiary hearing, the facts must be construed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs. 8 A section 1983 case may be dismissed without hearing if it fails to state a cause of action.' 7 But where the allegations are sufficiently serious, some determination of the underlying facts should be undertaken before judgment is rendered."8 Prisoners may therefore be tempted to include exaggerated facts in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing. The fear of great numbers of suits may not be justified but it is perceived as a problem. Too often this fear obscures the more accurate difficulty: the virtual unavailability of effective legal counsel and sound administrative remedies for prisoners. These should be available to every prisoner, not merely to those fortunate enough to be incarcerated in an enlightened institution or near an activist law school. Counsel would serve to draw more artful complaints and screen frivolous actions. Meanwhile the courts should be slow to dismiss complaints with serious allegations, even if they present farfetched statements of facts.
The problem of increasing numbers of prisoner complaints has led courts to fashion shorthand methods of ruling on them. One court pointed out that in medical care cases an examination of the prisoner's record may be dispositive of the case, especially where the allegation is denial of care by 1970). A related problem is that pro se complaints are often hard to fit into neat legal slots. Nevertheless, the courts are generally lenient in accepting such complaints despite the title affixed and classify the cases [Vol. 63 a physician." Where such records contain no information on the subject matter of the complaint, an evidentiary hearing is called for.
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Another shorthand device is used by the Ninth Circuit, which does not allow the complainant to be present at the hearing of his case.
101 While this rule makes it easier to pass on complaints, it may be damaging to the complainant because he is usually a necessary witness. The same court has, however, specified a complainant's procedural rights and they appear to ameliorate the absence of the right to be present at the hearing:
He is... entitled to have: (1) process issued arid served; (2) notice of any motion thereafter made by defendant or by the court to dismiss the complaint and the grounds therefore; (3) an opportunity to at least submit a written memorandum in opposition to such a motion; (4) in the event of dismissal, a statement of the grounds therefore; and (5) an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome the deficiency uriless it clearly appears from the complaint that the deficiency cannot be overcome by amendment. The Ninth Circuit's procedural compromise between a full evidentiary hearing and summary dismissal of the complaint is similar to the "amplifying" procedure explained by the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Simpson.°n The "amplifying" procedure may be used in cases where the petition's allegations are too conclusory or general for the court to treat, but the court feels the complaint may have merit if it were artfully drawn.
'
4 In such cases the court issues an order and accompanies it with a memorandum tb the prisoner telling him to file, in his own words, the specific facts and details of his grievance' 05 The Simpson court hinted that a complaint might be best amplified by appointing counsel to assist in the preparation of the petition.
06
It is interesting-and perhaps significant-that these circuit courts have adopted different yet parallel approaches in an attempt to salvage meritorious complaints while relieving somewhat the burden of holding an evidentiary hearing. Yet these approaches are flawed because without adequate and expert legal assistance in the prison, courts will not be able to correctly separate the frivolous from the meritorious complaint. 07 This problem is central to the adequate provision and vindication of prisoners' rights to medical care and will be examined thoroughly in the conclusion to this paper.
The class action, as seen in the Arkansas"°s and Virginian cases, can effectively change conditions throughout a state prison system. Instead of affecting the rights of a single prisoner, one case can have dramatic impact on thousands of inmates. Two arguments are forwarded to defeat class action in civil rights suits. The first is the practical problem of giving notice to large numbers of inmates and parolees." 0 The second is that since a civil rights.action is said to be available only in shocking or egregious cases, each prisoner's case should be treated individually."' The latter argument carries more force when the action is brought for damages than when injunctive relief is sought. Neither argument, however, should deter a court from granting injunctive relief to a class when federal rights are violated through general conditions rather than through numerous individual incidents 112
C. Habeas Corpus and Civil Rights Actions Compared; Herein of Exhaustion of State Renedies
The distinction between habeas corpus and civil rights actions has become quite blurred. The language of some courts could indicate that there is no longer a distinction and that in any suit brought by state prisoners in federal court, the form of a It becomes essential, therefore, to differentiate between th6 habeas corpus and section 1983 categories, in order to prevent circumvention of the requirement in habeas corpus cases that state remedies be exhausted. Judge Doyle offered the distinction that some suits are "traditional habeas corpus suits" while others are "extraordinary prisoner suits." "' The former simply attacks the validity of the state court judgment. In the latter, the prisoner concedes that he is lawfully imprisoned, but claims he is deprived of a constitutional right which he is entitled even inside prison. Judge Doyle's approach, however, is not simply an attempt to fit cases into the two categories he suggests. Rather, it is an attempt to identify the issues with respect to which exhaustion of state remedies should be required." 6 Judge Doyle's description of section 1983 actions as "extraordinary prisoner suits" is consistent with the underlying purposes of the federal civil rights remedy as determined by the legislative history in Monroe v. Pape," 7 in law review articles,"' and in the cases dealing with prisoner's rights to medical care. 119 The rule is that in extraordinary prisoner suits, complaining of internal prison conditions, the proper remedy is a section 1983 action. it is in the light of this rule that the broad language of Judge Coffin in The Eighth Circuit affirmed""6 but the Supreme Court reversed, stating two alternative grounds for reversal. The Court was of the opinion that "Section 2254 does not erect insuperable or successive barriers to the invocation of federal habeas corpus." I First, the Court read the exhaustion requirement of section 2254 to mean only that the state should be given an initial opportunity to correct violations of prisoners' federal rights. Where the state courts failed to indicate an alternative procedure or had never granted a hearing on the facts, habeas petitioners need not exhaust all available remedies." Second, the Court construed petitioners' allegations as pleading a section 1983 cause of action "for deprivation of constitutional rights by prison officials," and therefore exhaustion was unnecessary. n9 The Court concluded by citing with approval the language of Mr. Justice (then Judge) Blackmun in Jackson v. Bishop" 0 favoring a flexible approach in treating extraordinary prisoner suits as section 1983 actions. [Vol. 63 national figures,'1 indicates that the per capita amount spent on medical care for all citizens is from five to eleven times the amount spent on prisoners, depending on how the figures are interpreted. New York budgeted one half of one per cent of total prison expenditures for medical care while Americans spend approximately six per cent of disposable income after taxes on personal health care goods and services."' In the less tangible areas of medical care it has been found that patient involvement and the physician's personal attention has an influence on the quality of medical care."' This aspect of medical care is rarely found in maximum security prisons 5 Its absence is understandable in the light of current sociological knowledge about total institutions. 85 In human terms the totality and secretiveness of the large prison produces an iron law of contempt. In the repressive atmosphere and grinding routine of the prison, those in authority become hardened to the basic considerations of humanity expected in our society. Men who would be friendly, patient, and considerate without the walls become cold, curt, and hostile within. Shielded by secrecy they become calloused to the basic needs of prisoners. The point is not that the keepers are bad men but that ordinary men in a bad system cannot be good. What can be done to remedy these evils? Feasible solutions lie in three broad areas: political, institutional, and legal.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMJn iNDATIONS
A. Political Soludions
A political solution, in the form of a radically altered public attitude to criminal justice in general and prisons in particular, is both the most important and the least likely to occur." The figures from New York show that the public, or " 33 SOCIAL SxcuRiTr BuiuETrn 5 (July 1970 those who control the public purse, are not willing to spend as much on prisoners for medical care as is spent on the average citizen. Despite the rather elaborate prison medical facilities that exist in most states, the principle of "less eligibility" applies: the condition of the prisoner should not surpass that of the poorest-off employed citizen."' If ever there was a fixed rule of a science of penology, this is it. I seriously doubt whether the demand for social welfare on the part of prisoners will be translated into money and programs in the forseeable future. Hence, this solution is the most remote. However, there is something that lawyers can do in this regard. There is a growing recognition that despite the great moral and symbolic victories of the prisoners' rights cases which have assaulted the hands-off doctrine, their actual impact on the total system is limited."' Sol Rubin reminds us that the foundation for correctional work is statutory, and it is there that the greatest impact can be made. Statutory changes can effectively convert what are now privileges into rights for the entire prison population, can narrow the range of discretion where abuses have been frequent, and can motivate rule-making and more effective administrative control. 
B. Institutional Solutions
Any improvement in general prison conditions is bound to have some impact on the quality of medical care by reducing overcrowding, moving facilities closer to big cities and closer to a greater range of medical talent, and reducing prison populations and the number of people subject to prison medicine.IU Specific improvements in medical care are primarily the task of prison administrators and experts in the delivery of medical services. However, a few general observations can properly be made here. First, the state of knowledge concerning 13H. BARNEs 1 In an interview Professor Herman Schwartz has remarked, "Tactically, it may be a mistake to press lawsuits.. .," although it is not his intention to refrain from pressing suits. Attica at 823. prison medicine is poor. The last national survey of prison medicine was made in 1929."4 Publications since that time display either an unwitting blindness to the real problems of prison medicine' or an undue emphasis on exotic medical problems which do not solve the problem of generally inadequate care.'" The recent interest in delivery of effective medical care to poor people should also focus on prison medicine and hopefully lead to studies which have an impact on improving overall medical care behind the walls 45 Second, administrative changes may improve prison medicine by coordinating care efforts throughout a single prison system. Given the endemic lack of funds and personnel it is important to provide services efficiently and economically. In New York State since September, 1969, the medical services throughout the system have been under the control of a Medical Director, who is also the chief physician of a prison hospital. The post of medical director within a state's department of corrections is an unusual administrative feature and has the potential of making the concerns of the prison doctor more accessible to the state prison bureaucracy and assuring minimum levels of medical care.
14 Other states should study this approach. Third, the tenure of prison doctors, dentists, and nurses should be limited to a fixed period of five years. The iron law of contempt for inferiors is too powerful to leave the best-intentioned person unaffected. There is a real danger that the relatively sheltered position of a prison doctor will attract those seeking primarily a civil service sinecure, but there is a greater danger that the long exercise of power over the powerless will destroy public via the news media"'e this has a great, if indirect, impact on the improvement of prison medicine. The judicial recognition, enforcement, and even creation of procedural due process rights of prisoners has, perhaps, even greater potential. "' 6 At present, it is too easy for a legitimate demand for adequate care to be sidetracked by futile letterwriting to unheeding prison officials, or for custodial personnel to deprive prisoners of medical care by subverting medical orders.
It is widely recognized, however, that the present legal machinery is inadequate to handle the growing volume of prisoners' complaints or to effectuate across the board improvements. Indeed, one of the themes running through this paper has been the importance of effective legal representation to guarantee necessary services, and the present inability to provide those services. Two major innovations are the keys to the legal solution. The recent, dramatic involvement of lawyers and law students in prisoners' rights litigation. 1 5
will create new strains on the courts in the short run. But this is preferable to the growth of jail house lawyering and prisoner writ-writing, since it will ultimately reduce the burden on courts by screening frivolous complaints, by producing uniform and precise complaints, and by facilitating informal settlements of grievances where possible. The second innovation is the creation of independent hearing bodies with power to. investigate complaints, conduct hearings, inspect facilities and take corrective actions, if any are required. There are three models: negotiation, the ombudsman, and the grievance commission. 
